Breaking WEP in less than 60 seconds

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The WEP protocol

- In a wireless environment, data packets should be transmitted independently
- In WEP, all statations share a key (Rk), often called Root Key or Secret Key
- A per packet key (K = IV||Rk), is generated by choosing 3 bytes (IV) somehow random.
- A packet *m* is then encrypted *c* = *m* ⊕ RC4(K). The ciphertext *c* and the corresponding IV is then transmitted to the receiver.
- The reciver can reconstruct the per packt key and decrypt the packet

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What is wrong with that?

- By just concatinating IV and Rk, all packets are encrypted with very similar keys.
- The attacker always known the first 3 bytes of a packet key.
- Example, Rk = 00 01 02 03 04, packet keys could be

48 ac 64 00 01 02 03 04 27 55 06 00 01 02 03 04 bc 56 c6 00 01 02 03 04

• The RC4 Stream cipher has some statistical weaknesses

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Kleins work on RC4

Let X = X[0]||X[1]||... be a keystream and K = K[0]||K[1]||... be the RC4 key used to generate X.

Theorem

There are functions $f_i : (\mathbb{Z}/256\mathbb{Z})^{i+1} \to \mathbb{Z}/256\mathbb{Z}$ with:

- $\operatorname{Prob}(f_i(\mathsf{K}[0], ..., \mathsf{K}[i-1], \mathsf{X}[i-1]) = \mathsf{K}[i]) \approx \frac{1.36}{256}$
- and for every $a \neq K[i]$: $Prob(f_i(K[0], ..., K[i-1], X[i-1]) = a) < \frac{1}{256}$

And each function f_i can be computed very efficiently.

- If you can recover enough keystreams X with their IV, you can guess the first byte of Rk quiet well
- After you got the first byte, you can repeat it for all other bytes of Rk.

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Our work on RC4

Theorem

There are functions $g_{i,j}: (\mathbb{Z}/256\mathbb{Z})^{i+1} \to \mathbb{Z}/256\mathbb{Z}$ with:

• $\operatorname{Prob}(g_{i,j}(\mathsf{K}[0],...,\mathsf{K}[i-1],\mathsf{X}[i-1+j]) = \sum_{k=0}^{j} \mathsf{K}[i+k] \mod 256) > \frac{1}{256}$

• and for every
$$a \neq \sum_{k=0}^{j} K[i+k] \mod 256$$
:
 $\operatorname{Prob}(g_{i,j}(K[0], ..., K[i-1], X[i-1+j]) = a) < \frac{1}{256}$

And again, each function $g_{i,j}$ can be computed very efficiently.

- Instead of guessing bytes of Rk, we can now guess sums of bytes of Rk.
- After having guessed the sums, we can get the keybytes by computing the difference between two sums.

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Putting it all together

- In a WEP environment, you can get up to 800 packets per second, perhaps more.
- Using some advanced techniques, it is possible to get enough bytes of the keystream of these packets.
- Using the functions f_i or $g_{i,j}$ allows us to guess the right key, by applying them to many packets.
- Adding some additional error correction helps to improve success probability a lot, if only a few number of packets are available.

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Implementation

- Using some other protocol weaknesses, we can force a network to generate a lot of data packets.
- For these packets, it is easy to guess the keystream.
- Now, our implementation is able to guess the right key in less 3 seconds of cpu-time on an average mobile computer, if enough data packets are available.
- If 40,000 data packets are available, our success probability is around 50%, if 85,000 packets are available, we get the right key in 95% of all cases. (104 Bit keylength assumed)
- For 50% success probability, the whole operation can be completed in less than 60 seconds!

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• The successor protocol of WEP called *WPA* still uses RC4, but exchanges the key more frequently.

Can this be attacked too?

- Are there other protocols which use RC4 in a WEP like mode?
- For those of you who are intrested: Implementation is available at: http://www.cdc.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/aircrack-ptw/

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